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Islamic State (IS) caught the world’s attention because of their brutality and their 
individuality by using the globalized world in unprecedented ways. One of their 
introductions was the weaponization of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) drones. This 
research is an exploration of COTS drone proliferation across terrorist organizations 
through Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory’s four characteristics of diffusion: 
innovation, communication, time, and social system. Using a mixed methods approach, 
this research examines how DOI explains the international community is experiencing 
the “early adopter” phase of diffusion innovation. Viewing terrorist organizations’ use of 
COTS drone through the lens of DOI theory explains current trends and offers insight 
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As the world becomes more technologically advanced, so do terrorist 
organizations. With most advanced technologies, there is a natural progression from 
invention to commercial use. For example, one of the first computers was called the 
Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) created in the 1940s by the U.S. 
Army for “computing values for artillery range tables.”1 As time went on, inventors and 
engineers improved the computer and used innovative thinking to create better 
versions. Eighty years later, we walk around with more advanced and powerful 
computers on our wrist. The technology was commercialized, innovated, and diffused 
on a massive scale.  
The same concept is occurring with unmanned systems. In 1943, the first 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) took flight. The Kaiser-Fleetwings BQ-2 was an 
“expendable unmanned assault drone.” It was an autonomous UAS meant to carry a 
2,000-pound warhead and crash into a target.2 The Kaiser-Fleetwing is just one example 
of the world’s attempt to increase the impact of an attack while minimizing soldier risk. 
In this case, the UAS was deemed too expensive as a weapon on war and retired under 
the experimental (x-plane) classification. Originally used as a weapon of war—like the 
ENIAC— the technology was commercialized innovated and diffused on a massive scale. 
Today, state and non-state actors (both benevolent and malevolent) use UAS.  
                                                 
1 Michael R. Swaine, Paul A Freiberger, Encyclopaedia Britannica, “ENIAC Computer,” Accessed November 
11, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/ENIAC 





Everett M Rodgers developed the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory in 1962. The 
theory describes how innovation transfers amongst groups or individuals through 
four characteristics that affect the rate of innovation acceptance: innovation, 
communication, time, and social systems.3 While many researchers have used 
Rogers’ theory to explain the diffusion of technology, exploring weapon 
proliferation between terrorist groups through this lens is minimal. This paper will 
use the four characteristics of DOI as a framework to examine the proliferation of 
drones. Terrorist organizations like the Islamic State (IS) surprised troops in Iraq and 
Syria by weaponizing drones uniquely and effectively.  DOI theory will demonstrate 
that drone diffusion is at the “early adopter” level, which implies that many more 
terrorist groups will adopt drones as a weapon of war.   
Definitions 
Innovation has many meanings. Rodgers defines innovation as “an idea, practice, 
or object perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.”4 In contrast to 
Everett, Nicole Tishler – who examines terrorist weapons adoption—defines innovation 
differently. Tishler argues that terrorists do not invent new strategies or tactics. Instead, 
they improve upon already existing inventions.5 Amongst the literature on innovation, 
there is a discussion about the stochastic nature of “innovation.” Scholars like Tishler 
                                                 
3 Everett M. Rodgers. “Diffusion of Innovation,” New York: The Free Press, 2003 
4 IBID 
5 Nicole A. Tishler, “Trends in Terrorists’ Weapons Adoption and the Study Thereof,” International Studies 




and Rashmi Singh (who explores jihadi learning and innovation) require randomness to 
classify new behaviors as innovative.  
The broad spectrum of definitions requires a more in-depth understanding of 
terminology. There is a distinct difference between invention and innovation,6 and 
diffusion vs. contagion.7  Inventions are completely new ideas and technology, while 
innovation is an adaptation of already existing inventions.8 In addition, innovation 
“involves any improvement, modifications, or meaningful adaptations of existing 
technologies.”9 Examining this definition within the scope of this research, recreation 
UAS were not created by terrorist organizations, but using them as weapons is a form of 
innovation.  
Another vital definition is diffusion, which is “the process in which an innovation 
is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social 
system.”10 Similar to the distinction between invention and innovation, some scholars 
believe there is a difference between diffusion – a social phenomenon that requires 
communication between groups— and contagion – imitation of a behavior.11 The 
difficulty with the differentiation between contagion and diffusion is that contagion 
does not leave room for social media and propaganda as tools of communication, which 
is robust among terrorist organizations.  





10 Everett M. Rodgers. “Diffusion of Innovation,” New York: The Free Press, 2003 




Outside of the communication realm, there is a discussion of UAS, which covers 
a broad spectrum of capabilities. There are many different terms used in conjunction 
with UAS. Among the other common names are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) drones, and drones. Although the term drone is a 
colloquialism, scholars have added the term into their research, making it integrated 
into the discipline. COTS refers to any unmanned system purchasable commercially, 
which excludes military-grade UAS.  Therefore, UAS, UAV, and drones are used 
interchangeably, however COTS will specifically refer to commercialized technology.  
It is difficult to defining UAS because, as a category, there is a significant 
spectrum of individual capabilities. The U.S. Army uses a tier-system that places UAS 
into five categories ranging from nano drones to stealth drones.12 While the tier-system 
is the official classification system, it is used to define capabilities such as altitude and 
endurance and is generally applied to military-grade systems. This does little to aid the 
exploration of smaller commercial systems.  
The Center for a New America Security (CNAS) suggests a different classification 
system. Rather than only focusing on the abilities of the UAS, there should be a focus on 
“the degree to which they are accessible to any given actor… and the technology base 
and infrastructure required to produce and/or operate them.”13 Therefore, the four 
categories are hobbyist drones, midsize military and commercial drones, large military-
                                                 
12 “United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047,” United States Airforce 
Headquarters, Washington DC, 18 May, 2009, https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf 
13 Kelley Sayler, “A WORLD OF PROLIFERATED DRONES: A Technology Primer World of Proliferated Drones 




specific drones, and stealth combat drones. While an examination of the more complex 
UAS is fascinating, this paper will focus on COTS drones that generally share attributes 
like programmable with GPS, high-definition video, a real-time video feed, and semi-
autonomous capabilities.14 Hobbyist UAS are increasingly technologically sophisticated 
with user-friendly platforms that can act as a simple yet intelligent tool. In addition to 
their technological capabilities, COTS drones are easily accessible and are rapidly 
proliferating commercially. 
For this research, terrorist organizations are defined in two categories: state-
sponsored terrorist organizations and non-state terrorist organizations. State-sponsored 
terrorist groups are terrorist organizations that are backed by a state. Those groups 
have an added advantage of protection, funding, and training, which allows significant 
advantage regarding learning and innovation.15 While it is an interesting area of focus, 
state-sponsored groups have accessibility to safe havens, the transferring of knowledge, 
and (in the case of Iranian-backed groups) access to more advanced technology. 




The first characteristic of DOI theory discusses the innovation itself. Rodgers 
defines five characteristics of innovation which explains the likelihood that a new 
                                                 
14 Sayler. 




technology will become an attractive option.16 The characteristics are: relative 
advantage – does the innovation significantly improve the status quo; compatibility – 
how well does the innovation line up with needs, values and experiences of the group; 
complexity – is  the innovation intuitive or does it require significant training; trialability 
– is the innovation testable before the decision to incorporate it; and observability – 
after adopting, are the results tangible.17 Conceptually, if an innovation will 
demonstrate a significant advantage, is compatible with current operations, is not 
difficult to learn how to operate, is testable, and the benefits are apparent, the 
innovation will be a more attractive option to a group or individual which will result in 
more rapid diffusion of the technology. This increases the likelihood that the innovation 
will diffuse more rapidly. 
 
Communication 
The second characteristic of DOI theory is communication, which examines how 
different groups interact and the impact that has on the spread of the innovation. DOI  
explores communication between groups and their communication channels.18 Groups 
can spread messages in two ways. First, through mass channels like media or 
propaganda which are most effective at creating knowledge. Alternatively, they can 
depend on interpersonal channels which have the advantage at being most effective at 
                                                 






changing attitudes.19 While, according to Rodgers, interpersonal communication is the 
most effective communication method in terms of diffusion, his theory does not take 
into account modern-day propaganda and the way terrorist organizations employ it. In  
1962—when Rodgers created his framework—social media was non-existent and mass 
communication operated differently.  
While interpersonal communication is important, communication amongst non-
affiliated terrorist organizations is generally done indirectly. Terrorist organizations are 
learning from each other, and it is occurring across borders and outside established 
relationships and affiliations.20 According to Rashmi Singh, who explores learning and 
innovation, there are four types of terrorist learning: 1) learning between terrorist 
groups living within the same “domestic setting”; 2) learning between groups across 
state borders;  3) learning between transnational groups; and 4) self-learning where 
“learning occurs between the core and its affiliates.“21 Singh’s research focuses on 
terrorist organizations that are generally homophilic. This fails to acknowledge the 
reality that learning between groups that do not share similar attributes also occurs. 
Kettle and Mumford’s framework for terrorist learning helps understand learning 
and diffusion between heterophilic groups. Instead of categorizing groups by type of 
terrorist organization, Kettle and Mumford focus on four agents of learning: the 
                                                 
19 IBID 
20 Rashmi Singh, “A Preliminary Typology Mapping Pathways of Learning and Innovation by Modern 






individual, the group, the generation, and the organization.22 Generational learning is 
important to this research because the new generation of terrorists are more adaptive 
and resilient than previous generations and are offered an advantage because of their 
ease of access to learning materials due to the democratization of information.  
There are two types of knowledge: explicit and tacit.23 Explicit knowledge is 
information that can be written down or can be learned in a classroom, while tacit 
knowledge is information gained by experience. Terrorist organizations transfer explicit 
knowledge through formal and institutionalized lessons, while tacit knowledge—or 
informal learning—relies on interpersonal connection and social interaction.24 In 
addition to the transfer of tacit knowledge, Kettle and Mumford also include media, 
social media, and pop culture into informal learning.25 Learning between terrorist 
groups—whether formal or informal—promotes the diffusion of innovations.  
 
Time/Social System 
The third and fourth characteristics of DOI theory are time and social system. 
The two characteristics are interlaced. The time aspect of DOI theory focuses on how 
long it will take a group to accept or deny an innovation, which is dependent on the 
social system. The groups' decision-making process follows a progression: knowledge, 
                                                 
22 Louise Kettle and Andrew Mumford, “Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 523–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237224. 
23 Kettle and Mumford; Brian A. Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment 
Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 3 
(2001): 183–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100151130270. 
24 Kettle and Mumford, “Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework.” 
25 Kettle and Mumford; Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment 




persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation.  This process leads groups 
toward an adopt or deny decision.26 These steps are similar to the framework put forth 
by Kettle and Mumford, who describe the steps of terrorist learning to be identification, 
distribution, implementation, and retention.27 Jackson also refers to technological 
awareness, openness to new ideas, attitude toward risk, and nature of the environment 
as factors that influence a group’s decision to innovate.  
Class , also referred to as level of innovativeness, is the “degree of an individual’s 
adoption earlier than others in the social system.”28 The level of innovativeness depends 
on the decision-making process.29 Rodgers places individuals or groups who innovate 
into five categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and 
laggards.30 The rate of adoption fits the bell curve (seen in figure 1), where there are 
very few innovators, but as groups accept the innovation, there is a gradual then rapid 
diffusion of the technology. As seen in figure 1, the groups’ categorization is a predictor 
of when they will adopt an innovation. Using normal distribution, each of the categories 
are determined based on the standard deviation of average time. 
  
                                                 
26 Everett M. Rodgers. “Diffusion of Innovation,” New York: The Free Press, 2003 
27 Kettle and Mumford, “Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework.” 
28 Everett M. Rodgers. “Diffusion of Innovation,” New York: The Free Press, 2003 
29 IBID  




Diffusion of Innovation Bell Curve 
 
Figure 131  
 
Hypothesis 
 There is ample information about both state use of UAV and terrorism, but 
there is not substantial research on how terrorist groups use recreation drones. To focus 
the research, this paper examines non-state terrorist organizations. The state-backed 
groups will show up in the data sets used to demonstrate where the capabilities lie, but 
they will not be the focus of the analysis. As mentioned in the definition section, state-
sponsored terrorist organizations have an advantage because money and training are 
offered to them by their sponsor.32 Due to the support from state actors, they also use 
different types of UAS. State-sponsored terrorist groups with UAS capabilities – which is 
specific to Iranian sponsored groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis – generally 
                                                 
31 IBID  




use fixed-wing drones and precision-guided missiles rather than.33 Hence, they are not 
innovators. 
Using the DOI theory as a framework to examine the proliferation of COTS 
drones, this paper demonstrates that drone diffusion is at the “early adopter” level  
and—because of this—the characteristics set forth by Rodgers depicts drones as a  
perfect contender for proliferation. This means the world can expect a significant 
increase in terrorist groups using UAS in the near future. 
The DOI framework explains IS' use of UAS and how that technology is 
transferring to other terrorist groups. Traditionally, terrorist learning and tactics are 
transferred between groups due to affiliation and interpersonal communication. COTS 
drones ease-of-use and the way UAS are used as both a weapon and a tool for 
communication, will accelerate the rate of diffusion of the technology. To test this  
hypothesis, this paper uses a mixed-methods approach.  
 
Methods 
The research is organized by the four characteristics of the DOI theory while 
examining IS and COTS drones. IS is a starting point because its organization is the first 
to institutionalize the use COTS drones as weapons of war, making it the innovator of 
the technology. Tracing the movement of capabilities from that point makes connecting 
relationships easier. The hypothesis will be supported if there is a connection between 
                                                 




what Rodgers argues is a strong indication of innovation diffusion and what is currently 
occurring with recreational UAS.  
This paper also examines the available (yet limited) data to analyze if COTS drone 
proliferation is occurring and to which groups. Finding data on weaponized drones used 
by terrorists is difficult to collect because this is a relatively new phenomenon. The 
IntelCenter Database (ICD) is the most comprehensive open-source database available, 
but it does not offer a complete view. The benefits of ICD are its ability to offer a current 
collection of data that distinguishes the difference between perpetrator, target, and 
location. Unfortunately, there are gaps in the way terrorism-focused databases report  
weaponized UAS incidents. One issue with ICD is that it does not explicitly code for 
drone attacks meaning their reports include incidents where a drone was shot down,  
sighted, or captured, but it does not code the information differently.  
It is important to note that ICD uses news articles and open-source reporting to 
build its databases. It does not offer a holistic view of incidents. Unfortunately, this is an 
examination of the available material, and without access to classified material, it is 
difficult to know if more incidents are unaccounted for. Based on open-source material, 
the incidents recorded on ICD are also not an exact replication of what is occurring. In 
an attempt to mitigate the holes in the research, if there is a report inferring drone 
capabilities (i.e., UAV shot down, UAV used for ISR, weaponized UAV, etc.), the terrorist 
group is assumed to have the capability. While the weaponization of UAS are important, 




to arming the drone.34 For tracking proliferation, the use of the UAS is not as important 
as distinguishing if the terrorist organization has access to the technology. To 
supplement the database, terrorist propaganda, interviews, and media sources will be 
used to analyze available technologies.  
There is difficulty in researching terrorism and UAV because there are many 
unknowns. Terrorist groups are not transparent – although IS does use social media, 
making it more open in some aspects – and examining terrorist organizations’ 
capabilities is reliant on media outlets and propaganda campaigns. To help corroborate 
some of the information, three subject-matter experts were interviewed. Nick Waters, 
an open-source analyst for Bellingcat, is an expert on UAS systems and examines the 
technology and how IS manipulated it. The second interview was with Don Rassler, a 
scholar for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. His research examines how IS 
uses UAS and its supply chain. Finally, an interview with Major Aaron Smith, a Senior 
Security Cooperation Official in N’Djamena, Chad whose expertise lies in the Lake Chad 
Basin and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The interviews with subject-
matter experts will offer perspective on the open-source information.  
 
Data 
The Data provided by IntelCenter shows there is an increase of both UAS 
incidents, groups who have capabilities, and the geographical location of where COTS 
drones are operated.  In 2018 there was activity in six countries that did not previously 
                                                 




experience any drone incidents. This list grew by seven additional states in 2019. Figure 
2 (next page) demonstrates a significant increase in where groups are using UAS. This 
supports the assertion that drone use is proliferating. Examining the diversity of groups 
that use UAS over the four-year period also signifies proliferation between groups. The 
question then becomes what is responsible for this proliferation and does diffusion  






























































































































































































































































































































































































Based on many characteristics of UAS and the groups that use them, there is a 
high probability that the diffusion of weaponized drones will continue to proliferate at a 
rapid rate. To explain this rapid rate of diffusion, weaponized drones will be examined 
through the lens of the DOI theory.  
 
Innovation 
Non-state terrorist organization’s access to UAS is not a new revelation. Reports 
show groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have used UAS since 2004 when their state-
sponsor – Iran– supplied them with the Mirasad-1 and the Ababil-1.35  While these 
systems only had ISR capabilities, the first recorded armed-UAS attack was in September 
2014 by Hezbollah against al-Nusra Front in Syria. 36 Iranian-backed terrorist groups like 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis were the first terrorist organizations to have access 
to weaponized UAV. In an attempt to mimic their capabilities, IS developed the weapon 
through innovation and is transferring tactical knowledge to affiliate organizations. 
 IS may not be the first terrorist group to use armed drones, but their 
modifications of COTS drones gave the terrorist group unprecedented capabilities. 
Before the weaponization of drones, states had a near monopoly over the air domain. 
Don Rassler of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point describes the features 
that make UAV attractive to terrorist groups as “low acquisition costs, a variety of 
                                                 
35 Asaad Almohammad & Anne Speckhard, “ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations and 





purchasing pathways, potential for high accuracy, operational flexibility, a high 
likelihood of air-defense penetration, high survivability prelaunch and low levels if 
infrastructure needed to support their deployment.”37 Essentially, UAV fit perfect into 
Roger’s characteristics of an advantageous innovation.  
COTS drones offer significant relative advantages. First, when used for ISR, 
terrorists are given warning of approaching enemies. When used as a weapon, it 
eliminates the need for suicide bomber—the drone is flown over a target and then 
releases munitions.38 In addition to the strategic and tactical advantages, the DJI 
Phantom (a drone model used by IS) is easily purchased online for $799.00,39 making it 
both an affordable and attainable option. As mentioned by Rassler, there is no need to 
invest in additional infrastructure, and as long as the drone can be recharged, it offers  
flexibility.40   
There are multiple ways to turn a UAS into a weapon. As seen in the attempted 
assassination of Venezuelan President Maduro, one kilogram of C-4 was taped to two 
DJI Matrice –a quadcopter—and it was used as an “expendable drone.”41 Some 
researchers have referred to COTS drones with explosives attached as “flying IEDs”42—
given the crude adaptation makes it comparable to vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
                                                 
37 Don Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology” (West Point, 





40 Telephone Interview with Don Rassler, October 16th, 2019  
41 Brian Barrett, “The Explosive-Carrying Drones in Venezuela Won’t be the last,” Wired Magazine, August 
4, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/venezuela-drones-explosives-maduro-threat/ 




devices (VBIED). Early adaptations were rudimentary because the explosives were set to 
detonate remotely. These first examples were used as suicide drones. However, as IS 
became more experimental with the technology, it began to use drones weaponized 
with grenades that were engineered to drop on targets—enabling the reuse of the COTS 
drone.  
 
Figure 3: Custom-made COTS drone with a cup mounted to the bottom43 
 
At the beginning of the Syrian conflict—when IS was gaining territory—it was 
apparent to the organization that it needed more weapons than they could buy. So 
“they looted from the Iraqi or Syrian governments, but when those ran out they did 
something that no terrorist group has ever done before… [they] design[ed] their own 
munitions and mass-produce[d] them using advanced manufacturing techniques.”44 IS – 
when they took over territory— had access to commercial industries with industrial-
                                                 
43 Nick Waters, “Bellingcat - Death From Above: The Drone Bombs of the Caliphate - Bellingcat,” 
Bellingcat, 2017, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/02/10/death-drone-bombs-caliphate/. 
44 Brian Castner, “Exclusive: Tracing ISIS’ weapons supply chain—back to the US,” Wired Magazine, 




strength tools, saws, injection-molding machines, and people who knew how to use 
them.45 Like other non-state actors, IS crowd-sourced knowledge and skills. Many early 
recruits were ex-Iraqi officers who were ousted after the fall of Sadaam Hussein and 
became disenfranchised during the U.S. de-Baathification campaign. Using its 
knowledge of weapons and access to commercial tools and infrastructure, IS created a  
weaponized UAS and armed them with a 40mm grenade. 
 
Figure 4: 40mm grenades encased in custom made fins.46 
 
Figure 5: Supply of custom-made ammunition.47  
                                                 
45 IBID 
46 Nick Waters, “Death From Above: The Drone Bombs of the Caliphate,” Bellingcat, February 10, 2017 




Based on the DOI framework, COTS drones are an advantageous innovation for 
terrorist groups. There is a significant relative advantage associated with using them as 
both a weapon and, as described in the next section, a tool for communication. COTS  
drones are equipped with tools (such as GPS and semi-autonomous piloting) that make 
it compatible with IS operations and IS’ innovative weaponization of the technology  
increases the compatibility by creating a multifunctional tool. COTS drones are not  
particularly complex. They are equipped with GPS, are controllable with a smartphone, 
and have simple semi-autonomous capabilities (take-off and landing is achievable with a 
simple press of a button). Trialability is specific to groups. Terrorist organizations like IS 
who have controlled territory can test the innovation and experiment with operations, 
while terrorist groups who are trying to keep a low profile may not have the same 
freedoms. COTS drones are an attractive innovation to terrorist organizations based on 
the characteristics of an attractive innovation.  
 
Communication 
Communication amongst terrorist organizations occurs on multiple levels. As 
globalization created a world where the line between transnational criminal groups and 
transnational terrorist groups is blurred, it also created a world where communication is 
simple and not always intentional. IS is an interesting case because they were able to 
use mass communication channels and interpersonal communication simultaneously to 
contribute to the diffusion of weaponized UAS. As a recruiting tactic, IS used 




example, IS disseminated posters of a member holding a UAV and aiming toward the 
statue of liberty.48  Figure 6 is the image of a propaganda poster used to attract recruits 
using UAVs. Images like figure 6 and 7, and videos of weaponized drone attacks were 
posted on social media sites. IS released their first propaganda video demonstrating 
their ability to record and publish videos of army bases in Raqqa in August 2014. . These 
videos grew more sophisticated as they recorded battles and individual terrorist attacks 
which were quickly published on platforms like YouTube.49  
       Figure 6: IS Propaganda50     Figure 7: IS Propaganda51 
 
                                                 
48 Daniel Lebowitz,” TRAC Incident Report: Islamic State Telegram Channel Educates on Weaponized 
Drones,” TRAC Incident Report, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium  
49 AlMohammad  
50 Daniel Lebowitz,” TRAC Incident Report: Islamic State Telegram Channel Educates on Weaponized 
Drones,” TRAC Incident Report, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 
51 Daniel Lebowitz,” TRAC Incident Report: Islamic State Telegram Channel Educates on Weaponized 




By January 2017 that they uploaded their first propaganda video demonstrating 
their ability to drop customized munitions with accuracy.52 UAS quickly became a major 
part of the IS propaganda campaign, attracting the attention of many. While the  
influence on other groups may not be intentional, the combination of recreational UAS 
ease-of-use, instructional propaganda videos on how to operate and weaponize UAS, 
and accessibility in the commercial market, and the example put forth by IS created an 
interest.  
Interpersonal communication did not occur until after IS started losing territory. 
It is important to note that the data shows a dramatic drop in drone incidents by IS 
around the same time there is an increase in the number of groups who have 
capabilities. Figure 8 illustrates that the number of incidents attributed to IS dropped 
significantly from 2017 to 2018, with an increase in the number of attacks by unknown 
actors. Figure 9 demonstrates the same data organized by country. There is a drastic 
decrease in attacks in Iraq in 2018, with an increase of incidents in Syria at the same 
time. These numbers coincide with IS' loss of territory and American offensives targeting 
drone facilities.53 IS is not the only group using COTS drones, as indicated by reports of 
Kurdish groups using drones as well.  
      
 
                                                 
52 Waters, “Bellingcat - Death From Above: The Drone Bombs of the Caliphate - Bellingcat.” 
















While it is possible to track some interpersonal trends and IS migration trends to 
make assumption about intergroup and intragroup learning, focusing on the 
relationships between groups needs more research. Aaron Smith explains there is an 
increase in IS influence in the Lake Chad Basin. As IS lost control of their caliphate, there 
was an increase in the strength of ISWAP – a splinter group of Boko Haram.54 While the 
ICD did not show any recorded incidents of UAS activity in Africa, there are reports of 
ISWAP using COTS drones for ISR. As explained by the Soufan Center, “ISWAP has 
received tactical guidance from IS core, with innovation on utilizing drones merely part 
of this tacit knowledge transfer,”55 which demonstrates learning between groups is 
occurring.  
Group learning is occurring on more than an intragroup level – meaning there is 
a transfer of knowledge larger than just between affiliates. It is challenging to track 
relationships between terrorist organizations accurately, but COTS drone incidents are 
occurring in areas where there is an IS presence. For example, Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) and the Free Syrian Army – both attributed with UAS capabilities – do not have 
interpersonal ties to IS, but were the targets of IS drone attacks. It is interesting that IS 
presence in the region seems to be an indicator of capabilities. The technology is 
intuitive and accessible, making it possible to see, then imitate tactics. Further research 
into the connections between these groups and how they influence each other would 
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be advantageous to the discipline, especially as transnational terrorist groups are 
increasingly interconnected.  
It is possible that the reason for increased attacks in the region are because of 
state actors use military-grade UAV as a weapon in the Middle East and North Africa – 
which is where a majority of the groups are located. However, creatively finding a way 
to imitate state capabilities is part of the innovation process. By creating a way to 
replicate drone strikes in a way that was feasible for the organization, IS showed other 
groups that is was possible. This suggests that IS is the innovator, and other groups are 
early adopters.  
The relationship between how terrorist groups interact and how knowledge is 
transferred is necessary to understand why COTS are such an attractive option. IS uses 
both tacit and explicit knowledge to reinforce learning. Education of drone operations 
was institutionalized with explicit knowledge – demonstrated by classroom learning and 
making publicly available videos published on social media.56 Drones—specifically 
quadcopters—are unique in that they are highly intuitive and have semi-autonomous 
capabilities. The easier a technology is to use, the less tacit knowledge is needed for 
successful acceptance of the tech into operations.  
The one aspect of drone operations that does require tacit knowledge is the 
weaponization of the drone. This is where the tracking of relationships is possible. 
Figure 8 shows a significant drop of attacks at the end of 2017. There are many factors 
that contributed to this. Anti-drone technology became a priority to thwart IS’ 
                                                 




functionality in the air domain,57 but the most important factor was the recapturing of 
land in Iraq and Syria. The loss of territory resulted in the migration of members of IS to 
their affiliate groups with a significant increase in Africa.58 This is significant to learning 
because as migrants move out of Iraq and Syria to other regions, they take their 
knowledge with them. Figure 10 and 11 shows a significant increase in the number of 
groups with UAS from 2017 to 2018, with two groups claiming responsibility of 33 
incidents in 2017 to four groups claiming responsibility for 15 attacks in 2018. In both 
years there are “Unknown” perpetrators but based on location (see figure 8 and 9) 
attribution can be placed in either IS or PKK.  
As explained by DOI theory, interpersonal contact is an indicator that a group 
will accept an innovation quicker than through mass media. For this reason, tracking 
militant migration patterns could be used as a predictive model to explore future 
proliferation trends.  
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The social system and time characteristics will depend on the terrorist group and 
should be used to evaluate the likelihood of a group to accept the innovation. While 
innovation and communication are the most important characteristics in tracking how 
groups attain the technology, social system and time are indicators of the likelihood that 
a group will adopt.  
DOI theory connects leadership style to the decision-making process, which 
affects the rate of adoption. Generally, more rigid leadership structures are less likely to 
adapt unless there is a persuasive voice that can inform the leadership’s decision-
making. In respect to IS, it is clear by the type of munitions used by individuals in 
different areas of the caliphate that leadership welcomes strategic freedoms as long as 
it follows the commander’s intent.59 It is possible to trace – based on images and videos 
– where drones operated tactically based on the type of warhead and tail of the 
dropped munitions60 suggesting a more relaxed leadership structure that welcomes 
innovation. Groups that are daring and experimental are more likely to adopt, and 
specifically relating to drones, having a safe zone to operate supports trialability. 
Time characteristic of innovativeness is a large indicator of rate of adoption 
placing groups into categories – innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, 
and laggards – based on the innovativeness of the group. Looking at a group’s 
tendencies and tactics is a good indicator of their level of innovativeness. IS is known to 
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be inventive in their recruitment efforts, their targeting procedures, and with their use 
of social media. Groups like the PKK, ISWAP, the Free Syrian Army, and the Khalistan 
Liberation Force are Early Adopters because of the rate of adoption.  
Leadership decision-making structure and time can also explain why al-Qaeda 
(AQ) does not use UAS. Their leadership structure is known to be hierarchal and 
stringent. Which may indicate that AQ does not allow for interpretation or adaptation – 
one of the reasons for the splintering of al-Qaeda in Iraq into IS. There is a degree of 
trial-and-error and risk that comes with adopting new technologies, and groups must be 
willing to accept the risks. The reason for the more conservative approach could be the 
need to regain strength after the death of Osama bin Laden, the splintering of IS, and 
the setbacks they took by expanding too quickly and losing control of groups like al- 
Shabaab. Regardless of the reasons, AQ does not possess UAS capabilities.   
It would be advantageous for future research to explore the relationship 
between innovativeness and terrorist splintering verses integration with an already 
established terrorist organization. If a group breaks from its mother organization does it 
indicate that they are innovators or early adopters? Contrary, if a group decides to join a 
larger organization does it mean they are more complacent and less imaginative? 
Historically, innovative attacks are the most devastating. AQ’s use of hijacked airplanes 
were unexpected because it was a new and creative plan. If this research is used as a 
starting point to create a framework or algorithm that categorizes terrorist organization 




Global security professionals and scholars could use the tool as a potential threat 
indicator. 
Conclusion 
The Diffusion of Innovation Bell Curve (Figure 1) offers interesting insight into 
the future. Based off of the DOI framework, IS fits into the “innovator” category. They 
took a technology and created a new tool of hybrid warfare. COTS drones are used for 
ISR, propaganda, and strategic strikes. As more groups adopt COTS drones – as the Bell 
Curve demonstrates—there is rapid increase of other groups adopting the technology as 
well. Currently, terrorist organization using COTS drones are at the “early adopter” level 
but based on the four characteristics what this research explains about drones, there 
will be a rapid increase of groups using them in the future. 
This research has only scratched the surface of what is, and will be, a significant 
risk to global security. DOI theory explains that COTS drones are an attractive innovation 
for terrorist organizations because it is affordable, attainable, multi-functional, and 
offers unprecedented tactical and strategic advantages. Before UAS proliferated to the 
non-state level, the war on terror was fought on a two-dimensional battlefield. As the 
technology continues to diffuse, militaries will need to adapt to fighting terrorists on a 
three-dimensional plane.  
In addition to the tactical significance, UAS act as a communications tool by using 
the ability to record attack and share videos of the success with supporters over social 
media. This supports the diffusion of UAVs by reaching large audiences and opens their 




drone is possible without an exchange of tacit knowledge. Simultaneously, after the fall 
of the caliphate, IS migration is pushing members with tacit knowledge into other 
territories and groups, resulting in communication on both a mass and interpersonal 
level. 
 Further research into social structure and time are needed. The innovation and 
communication sections help in describing why drone use is proliferating but building a 
framework around how social structure and the different levels of innovativeness will 
offer predictability. Knowing which characteristics signify how innovative a group is will 
allow governments time to react on the ground. Also, based on DOI theory, COTS drones 
and how they are armed can act as a tool to connect relationships between terrorist 
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